What's Distinctive about Feminist Analysis of Law

A Conceptual Analysis of Women's Exclusion from Law

Bibliographic Data

ID7533296
AuthorsDenise G Réaume (0000-0003-4098-8386, University of Toronto, corresponding author)
Year1996
Volume2
Issue4
Pages265-299
Publication date1996-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLegal Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1352-3252 • E-ISSN: 1469-8048
PublisherCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/s1352325200000549
OpenAlexW3123323877
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited21

What is distinctive about a feminist analysis of law? Conversely, what does it mean to characterize the law (or a law) as distinctively “male” as a way of criticizing its injustice? It is widely assumed by both feminist scholars and nonfeminists or curious onlookers that a feminist analysis of law must have distinctive features that set it off from mainstream/“malestream” theories of law. Feminist scholars often try to “sell” feminist analysis to interested newcomers and try to break down the recalcitrance of those who seem to want to marginalize and dismiss it precisely by claiming a difference of perspective for feminist analysis of which no well-educated lawyer or legal commentator can afford to be ignorant. Meanwhile, feminist claims are also challenged by those who think they can reach the same conclusion on independent grounds for therefore not being distinctively feminist; “What makes that particularly feminist?” the communitarian, for example, will ask, faced with an argument that feminism is critical of the individualistic bias of the legal system

Argument (complex analysis · Feminism · Feminist Legal Theory · Feminist philosophy · Feminist theory · Injustice · Mainstream · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Sociology · Gender Studies · Law · Law in Society and Culture · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Multicultural Socio-Legal Studies

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub