When Will They Ever Make Up Their Minds? The Social Structure of Unstable Decision Making
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7535833 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andreas Flache (0000-0002-8276-8819, University of Groningen, corresponding author), Andreas Flache∗, René Torenvlied (0000-0003-1669-0782, Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 171-196 |
| Publication date | 2004-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00222500490480257 |
| OpenAlex | W2138484232 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 18 |
French (1977), Harary (1959), and Abelson (1964) initiated a prominent line of social influence models to explain social norms or collective decisions from the structure of influence networks. These models fail to generate unstable decision dynamics, a phenomenon that can be observed in collective decision-making. To capture instability, we assume that decision-makers raise their level of salience to reduce expected losses from decision-outcomes. Our model generates persistently unstable outcome patterns under conditions related to the social network and to intolerance for expected losses. A 6-actor example reveals stable outcomes for low intolerance, complex oscillations for intermediate levels of intolerance, and simple and regular oscillation for high intolerance. We discuss implications for the predictability of collective decision-making
Cognitive psychology · Economics · Norm (philosophy · Political science · Positive economics · Predictability · Salience (neuroscience · Sociology · Statistics · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Law · Mathematics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Social Psychology
The Organizational State
A Formal Theory of Social Power
Political Decisions and Agency Performance
Norm formation in social influence networks
Modeling Social Processes
Unanimous opinions in social influence networks
Strategic control and interests, its effects on decision outcomes
A Computer Simulation Model of Community Referendum Controversies
Nonlinear Transformation in a Landslide
Games Real Actors Could Play
Is Implementation Distinct from Political Bargaining
Learning Theory and the Logic of Critical Mass
Choice Shift and Group Polarization
Modeling Social Processes
Foundations of Social Theory
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2022 (11) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |