Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7536974 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lars Bo Gundersen (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-20 |
| Publication date | 2004-02-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00184.x |
| OpenAlex | W1968320404 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 9 |
It is argued that the so‐called principles of “strong centering” and “weak centering” central to the traditional Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals are both fallacious. A foundation for an alternative semantics without these prinsciples is outlined. The core idea is that the statistically normal worlds – rather than those worlds most qualitatively similar to the actual world – should serve as the semantical fulcrum
Cognitive science · Core (optical fiber · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence · Linguistics · Possible world · Programming language · Semantics (computer science · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Computer Science · History · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,45 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2024 (19) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |