It Isn't Just about Greece
Domestic Politics, Transparency and Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7677230 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Alt (Hertie School), David Dreyer Lassen (0000-0002-4368-9851, Hertie School), Joachim Wehner (0000-0002-1951-308X, Hertie School) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 707-716 |
| Publication date | 2014-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123414000064 |
| OpenAlex | W1991825396 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 20 |
This article analyzes the political origins of differences in adherence to the fiscal framework of the European Union (EU). It shows how incentives to use fiscal policy for electoral purposes and limited budget transparency at the national level, combined with the need to respond to fiscal rules at the supranational level, interact to systematically undermine the Economic and Monetary Union through the employment of fiscal gimmicks or creative accounting. It also explains in detail how national accounts were manipulated to produce electoral cycles that were under the radar of the EU budget surveillance system, and concludes with new perspectives on the changes to (and challenges for) euro area fiscal rules
Accounting information system · Creative accounting · Economic and monetary union · Economic policy · Economics · European union · Fiscal policy · Fiscal union · Incentive · International economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Transparency (behavior · Accounting · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law
Fiscal discipline in EMU? Testing the effectiveness of the Excessive Deficit Procedure
Do fiscal rules need budget transparency to be effective
Governments manipulate official Statistics
When all is said and done
New data, new results? How data sources and vintages affect the replicability of research
Multi-level hegemony in transboundary Flood Risk Management
Many shades of wrong
Negotiating implementation of EU fiscal governance
State-owned enterprises, fiscal transparency, and the circumvention of fiscal rules
Une arme à double tranchant ? Le recours aux partenariats public-privé et la maîtrise des risques budgétaires
Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles
How Much Should We Trust the Dictator’s GDP Growth Estimates
Do transparency mechanisms reduce government corruption? A meta-analysis
How did the euro area survive the crisis
The politics of fiscal rules within the European Union
Austerity and credibility in the Eurozone
Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis
Opportunistic Election Timing, a Complement or Substitute for Economic Manipulation
Balancing the books or winning votes
Fiscal illusion at the individual level
A Window of Opportunity
Tax Preferences, Fiscal Transparency, and the Meaning of Welfare
Financial Data Transparency, International Institutions, and Sovereign Borrowing Costs
Interest groups and policy volatility
Parsing the impact of E‐government on bureaucratic corruption
The political economy of the Greek economic crisis in 2020
Oil, elections and fiscal transparency
Leveraging uncertainty, market-power, and fiscal opacity
Transparency in Government Operations
Fiscal Governance in Europe
Amelia II
The Causes of Fiscal Transparency
Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy
After Hegemony
Public accounting fudges towards EMU
Domestic Budgets in a United Europe
Making the EMU
Information Systems in Treaty Regimes
International Scrutiny and Pre-Electoral Fiscal Manipulation in Developing Countries
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
| Citations per year | 2.55 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |