Narrative Dispossession

Tibet and the Gendered Logics of Historical Possibility

Bibliographic Data

ID7730964
AuthorsCarole Mcgranahan (0000-0001-5187-4769, University of Colorado System, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume52
Issue4
Pages768-797
Publication date2010-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Studies in Society and History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-4175 • E-ISSN: 1475-2999
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0010417510000460
OpenAlexW2135661344
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited57

To possess something is an unpredictable combination of the following: to have, to own, to know, or to control. Land, stories, resources, equanimity, and loyalty are all examples of materially incommensurate things a person might possess. Even without material wealth, for example, one might be said to be in possession of a wicked sense of humor or a good memory or despite all else, one's own life story. Possessing one's own life story, however, is not a given. Thinking of one's life as a story, as something that can be narrated, involves social processes and conventions operative well beyond individual processes of reflection or experience. Narrating one's life, then, is to situate oneself and to be situated in dialogue with society. 1 As such, whether one's narrative is consensual with or contradictory to social norms, such narration signals possession of shared structures of possibility, including normative understandings of history, memory, knowledge, and truth. To narrate one's life is not just an issue of how, but also a matter of if

Aesthetics · Art · Epistemology · Linguistics · Literature · Narrative · Normative · Possession (linguistics) · Situated · Sociology · Chinese history and philosophy · Philippine History and Culture · Philosophy · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub