Institutional Breakdown and International Cooperation

The European Agreement to Recognize Croatia and Slovenia

Bibliographic Data

ID7770879
AuthorsDavid H Bearce (0000-0001-6239-4066, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume8
Issue4
Pages471-497
Publication date2002-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of International Relations (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1354-0661 • E-ISSN: 1460-3713
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1354066102008004002
OpenAlexW2068136796
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited51

Using the logic of a two-phase cooperation framework (first bargaining to reach an agreement, then enforcement of the negotiated agreement), this article examines how the risk of institutional breakdown can help promote international cooperation. I argue first that the risk of institutional breakdown can help promote bargaining cooperation by raising the opportunity costs of bargaining failure, thus providing a strong incentive for states who value the fragile international institution to negotiate a cooperative agreement. Having helped states to reach a cooperative bargain, the risk of institutional breakdown can also play a role in the subsequent enforcement phase. I argue second that the risk of valued institutional breakdown can reduce state preferences for defection, moving the enforcement problem away from the standard Prisoners' Dilemma structure. To illustrate these arguments, I examine the European Community's decision to recognize the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia

Business · Dilemma · Economics · Enforcement · Incentive · Institution · International economics · International trade · Law and economics · Market economy · Negotiation · Political science · European Union Policy and Governance · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

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