Bargaining Power and Trade Liberalization
European External Trade Policies in the 1960s
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7770910 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andreas Dür (0000-0001-6621-7243, University College Dublin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 645-669 |
| Publication date | 2008-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of International Relations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-0661 • E-ISSN: 1460-3713 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066108097556 |
| OpenAlex | W2038450523 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 29 |
Shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC, 1958), European countries accepted a far-reaching liberalization of their previously fairly protectionist external trade relations. I provide an explanation of this astonishing development that builds on the argument that the establishment of a customs union increases the bargaining power of its member countries in international trade negotiations. When facing discrimination from a customs union, exporters in excluded countries have an incentive to become politically active and lobby their governments for relief. This increase in exporter lobbying, in turn, weakens the negotiating position of excluded countries in international trade negotiations by making them more eager to achieve a negotiated agreement that lowers the external barriers of the customs union. The evidence presented backs this argument by showing that the EEC member countries accepted external trade liberalization in the 1960s because they could gain disproportionate concessions for European exporting interests in international trade negotiations
Bargaining power · Commercial policy · Economics · European union · Free trade · International economics · International free trade agreement · International trade · Liberalization · Market economy · Multilateral trade negotiations · Negotiation · Political science · Protectionism · Trade barrier · European Union Policy and Governance · Global trade and economics · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Trading Blocs
Empowering Exporters
Trading Voices
The Regionalization of the World Economy
Trade Policy and Economic Growth
Veto Players
Foreign Discrimination, Protection for Exporters, and U.S. Trade Liberalization
Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection
Endogenous Protection and Trade Negotiations
The Statistical History of the United States
The European Common Market
Beyond the European Community
The European Common Market
Opening America's Market
Western Europe and the American Balance of Payments
What Happened to Fortress Europe
Power and Political Institutions
EU Trade Policy as Protection for Exporters
Power Politics and the Free Trade Bandwagon
Opening America's Market
American Trade and Power in the 1960s
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,43 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2025 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |