Building a new Europe

Britain, Germany and the problem of Russia

Bibliographic Data

ID7785308
AuthorsAnthony Glees (corresponding author)
Year1999
Volume8
Issue1
Pages150-180
Publication date1999-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueGerman Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0964-4008 • E-ISSN: 1743-8993
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09644009908404546
OpenAlexW1966254748
LanguageEN
References cited10

This article is intended to be a contribution to the study of the politics of the Anglo‐German relationship, and to the politics of NATO enlargement, seen purely within this context. It is not concerned with the validity of any strategic arguments concerning enlargement, the organisational or the financial problems stemming from this policy, or the wider strategic issues raised by this policy. From 1992 until 1 May 1997 the bilateral Anglo‐German relationship exhibited ever deeper fissures in policy on European integration, and on monetary union in particular. Yet, Anglo‐German policy in respect of NATO's eastern expansion and its relations with the new Russia, which reflected an integrating Europe from a different perspective, was characterised by fundamental agreement. This paradox, it is suggested, indicates that policy on Europe suffered more from ideological conflict on European integration within the governing Conservative Party during the period under review than from an inherent or necessary conflict of national interest between Britain and Germany

Context (archaeology · Economic policy · Economic system · Economics · Economy · European integration · European union · Foreign policy · German · Ideology · Perspective (graphical · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Resizing · Sociology · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · History · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

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