Agenda setting in the German Bundestag
A weak government in a consensus democracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7785403 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ulrich Sieberer (0000-0003-4027-1393, University of Mannheim, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 49-72 |
| Publication date | 2006-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | German Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0964-4008 • E-ISSN: 1743-8993 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09644000500534972 |
| OpenAlex | W2043045874 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 26 |
Government agenda-setting rights in the Bundestag are weak. The theoretical part of this article discusses various aspects of agenda setting and their theoretical relevance in the context of the Bundestag. It will be argued that analyses of agenda setting should distinguish between two analytical foci, one concentrating on policy effects in the context of spatial models, the other analysing executive–legislative relations in the broader context of political competition. In addition, agenda setting among veto players should be distinguished from agenda setting between veto players and non-veto players. While the article's theoretical part drives the subsequent empirical analysis, readers more interested in the empirical aspects of agenda setting in the Bundestag may wish to turn directly to the article's second section, which provides an empirical and descriptive account of the formal rules of agenda setting in the Bundestag. In this part, it will be argued that the weakness of the government under the Bundestag's first permanent rules of procedure introduced in the early 1950s can be explained by historic circumstances. Since then, party system characteristics and the strong role of the Bundesrat have made it unattractive for the federal government to seek increased agenda control in the Bundestag. Overall, agenda setting rules in the Bundestag underscore the characterisation of Germany as a consensus democracy
Context (archaeology · Democracy · Economics · German · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Relevance (law · Sociology · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration
Towards Convergence? New Labour's Third Way and the SPD's Agenda 2010 in Comparative Perspective
Konzeptionalisierung und Messung formalen Institutionenwandels – Das Beispiel parlamentarische Regeln
Institutional dynamics and party think tank development
Wie gelangen Themen auf die parlamentarische Agenda
Conflict and Consensus in Germany's Bi-cameral System
Political central bank coverage
The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments
Negative Agenda Control and Executive–Legislative Relations in East Central Europe, 1997–2008
Shadow chairs as monitoring device? A comparative analysis of committee chair powers in Western European parliaments
Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction
No politics in the agenda-setting meeting
Free votes and the analysis of recorded votes
Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game
How effects on party unity vary across votes
Recorded Votes as Attention Booster
How much power do oppositions have? Comparing the opportunity structures of parliamentary oppositions in 21 democracies
Policy-making power of opposition players
Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94
Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976–2005
Communicating supranational governance? The salience of EU affairs in the German Bundestag, 1991–2013
Institutional Factors and Agreement in Lawmaking
The Efficient Secret
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
Rationalizing Parliament
Making and Breaking Governments
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Veto Players
Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Patterns of democracy
Time as a Scarce Resource
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe
Agenda-setting in the German Bundestag
The keys to togetherness
Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany
Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations
Party unity in parliamentary democracies
Chancellor Schröder's approach to political and legislative leadership
The German Party System
The checks and balances of party federalism
Making Policy Stick
Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Bargaining in Legislatures
| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,05 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |