The American Empire and its Discontents

I am just so amazed that there is so much misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us.... like most Americans, I just can't believe it, because I know how good we are.-George W. BushThe ancient tale of Damocles conveys a lesson often overlooked in the conduct of present-day international affairs - a lesson that warrants heeding especially now, given the global euphoria attending the transfer of power in Washington from the much-loathed George W. Bush to the much-loved Barack Obama. The lesson is this: that great power cannot fail but to bring grave danger to its possessor.As Damocles learned the hard way, great power fails to bring perpetual and blissful security and peace to the one yielding it. A more frequent and far more disturbing by-product of great power is the constant and unavoidable danger of being the target of choice for the hostility of those less well endowed. Rather than constituting a blessing, great power comes with the terrible curse of never-ending enmity.As the Romans, the Britons, and now the Americans have found out time and again, any variety of pax, be it Romana, Britannica, or Americana, does not mean in the least, as is the common assumption, tranquillity or a worry- free existence for its enforcer. If anything, the hegemon must be on constant alert to preserve the semblance of order it attempts to impose on the international system in the face of permanent resentment and, consequently, of the continual threat of uprising. True enough, resentment against hegemonic rule may not necessarily be translated from mere dislike or animus into vigorous resistance. Moreover, the rebels who choose to fight against the hegemon may well fail to join forces or coordinate their actions due to their own rivalries or incompatibilities. Finally, there is no guarantee that, should they ever muster the will to resist, the weaker states, even successfully grouped into a coalition, will manage to emerge triumphant in their confrontation with the hegemon.1 Such mitigating circumstances notwithstanding, this article advances the view that anti-hegemonic action remains an ever-present feature of international politics, even if it is at times muted, isolated, or bears no chance of success.Why should the hegemon be the object of permanent hatred, if it is genuinely well-meaning and openhanded? Three reasons can be advanced: envy, dissatisfaction, and humiliation. These are effects that a hegemon provokes in weaker states, try as it may to avoid generating such discontent. States will consequently resist even a benevolent hegemon because of their concern with the relative, rather than the absolute, gains it secures; because of its inability to distribute rewards (or to hand out penalties) in a fair, equitable, and satisfactory manner among its allies and clients; and because of the requirements of prestige that demand a special position of deference for the hegemon, thus setting it above other states in terms of respect. Given the extent of this unavoidable resentment, the American empire, like Damocles, is likely to soon realize the downsides of international preeminence.PROSPECTS OF EMPIRE: THE PESSIMISTSWill the US political, military, and economic preponderance established, or at least reinforced, in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union endure? Both pessimistic and optimistic answers have been offered to this question since the early 1990s. For pessimists, the US cannot escape the common destiny of all empires: ultimately, like Habsburg Spain, Bourbon and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany, classical liberal Britain, and Communist Russia, the dominance of the US is not meant to last. For optimists, conversely, there are reasons to believe that the US may well represent the one lonely exception to this cyclical historical pattern of imperial rise and fall, and its leadership over the international community will therefore likely continue for, at the very least, decades to come

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