Knowledge, power and monetary bargaining

Central bankers and the creation of monetary union in Europe

Bibliographic Data

ID7879957
AuthorsMatthias Kaelberer (0000-0002-1107-7287, corresponding author)
Year2003
Volume10
Issue3
Pages365-379
Publication date2003-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/1350176032000085351
OpenAlexW2155954022
LanguageEN
Citations received10

This article specifies and explains the role of central bankers as an epistemic community in the process of European monetary co-operation. The article argues that it is necessary first to find the right balance between structure and agency and second to specify alternatives to the observed outcomes. While structure is arguably a strong shaping force for outcomes in monetary bargaining, it is ultimately indeterminate in predicting change. Contrasting the Maastricht process with potential alternative outcomes, I argue that the content of the Maastricht Treaty on European monetary union can be explained largely by underlying structural factors. On the other hand, the process of institutional change itself raises the issue of agency. Within this process of institutional change, the epistemic community of central bankers played a special role to facilitate the Maastricht accord

Agency (philosophy · Bargaining power · Economic and monetary union · Economics · European debt crisis · European integration · European monetary union · European union · International economics · Maastricht Treaty · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Monetary hegemony · Monetary policy · Political science · Power (physics · Process (computing · Sociology · European Union Policy and Governance · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Global Financial Regulation and Crises

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