Analysing the trade-off between transparency and efficiency in the Council of the European Union

Bibliographic Data

ID7879980
AuthorsStéphanie Novak (0000-0001-5918-1836, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, corresponding author), Maarten Hillebrandt (0000-0003-0002-7898, Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany)
Year2020
Volume27
Issue1
Pages141-159
Publication date2020-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501763.2019.1578814
OpenAlexW2914102819
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited48

This article analyses the oft-invoked tension between transparency and efficiency in the context of the Council of the European Union. It asks to what extent these two sources of legitimacy are incompatible, by exploring the premises and the coherence of the trade-off argument. It argues that the argument is unclear because of the multiple meanings of efficiency. Furthermore, while the trade-off is in some instances more plausible than in others, transparency does not necessarily threaten efficiency and can sometimes even increase it. The presumed correlation between secrecy and efficiency, on which the trade-off is implicitly based, can also be questioned on theoretical and empirical grounds. For these reasons, the trade-off argument forms a generally contingent and often questionable basis for limiting transparency

Argument (complex analysis · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy · Context (archaeology · Economics · European union · International trade · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Secrecy · Transparency (behavior · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Ombudsman and Human Rights · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub