The social democratic predicament in the emerging European Union

A capital dilemma 1

Bibliographic Data

ID7879989
AuthorsJonathon W Moses (0000-0002-8842-7919, corresponding author)
Year1995
Volume2
Issue3
Pages407-426
Publication date1995-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501769508406995
OpenAlexW2138382447
LanguageEN
Citations received19
References cited35

This article models the social democratic predicament in two stages. First, the corporatist bargaining arrangement familiar to Nordic social democracies is sketched in simple game terms. With highly centralized collective bargaining arrangements, successful policy outcomes can be understood as solutions to something akin to a prisoners' dilemma problem. The government plays a guarantor's role in this capital‐closed economy game, using traditional macroeconomic policies to help secure co‐operative, Pareto efficient, solutions. The second stage introduces (financial) capital mobility. With increased capital mobility, traditional macroeconomic policies are shown to be less efficient, jeopardizing the ability of governments to induce co‐operative equilibrium. While the models are designed with the Nordic social democracies in mind, the author generalizes about their utility for describing the fate of other industrialized economies in an increasingly integrated regional and international economy

Capital (architecture · Democracy · Dilemma · Economic policy · Economic system · Economics · European union · Government (linguistics · Majority rule · Market economy · Microeconomics · Pareto principle · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Social capital · Social dilemma · Economic Theory and Institutions · Political Economy and Marxism · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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