The politicisation of the European Central Bank and its emergency credit lines outside the Euro Area

Bibliographic Data

ID7880244
AuthorsLukas Spielberger (0000-0001-7533-3190, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume30
Issue5
Pages873-897
Publication date2023-05-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501763.2022.2037688
OpenAlexW4212783624
LanguageEN
Citations received16
References cited62

Is the European Central Bank (ECB) increasingly acting on political – rather than technocratic – considerations? This question is of a central concern to students of European Union (EU) political economy. This article contributes to this debate by studying the ECB’s credit lines to the central banks of EU member states outside the Euro Area during the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. Both times the ECB accorded selectively better borrowing conditions to some central banks. The article finds that its selection of who gets favourable borrowing terms has indeed become more political. In 2008, the ECB decided the credit terms based on technocratic criteria, but twelve years later, it granted better lending conditions to countries that were close to adopting the euro. How the ECB balances its mandate for price stability in the Euro Area and its role as a supranational EU institution decides whether it will become more politicised

Banking Union · Economic policy · Economics · European debt crisis · European integration · European union · Financial crisis · Financial system · International economics · Keynesian economics · Mandate · Political economy · Political science · Political union · Politics · Technocracy · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law

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