A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7894736 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fabio Franchino (0000-0001-8774-6494, School of Public Policy, University College London,, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 217-247 |
| Publication date | 2005-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629805050861 |
| OpenAlex | W2116275691 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 19 |
This article develops a formal model of the politics of delegation in the European Union (EU) incorporating key institutional features: the legislative-executive role of the Commission, the legislative-executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national administrations and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to the Commission and increases its discretion. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in the case of many administrators and a high threshold for decision-making; and, second, a less demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an administrator with agenda-setting power
Commission · Delegation · Discretion · Economics · European union · International trade · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Status quo · Veto · EU Law and Policy Analysis · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Public Administration
Towards an Effective European Single Market
Towards an Effective European Single Market
The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union
Curb EU enthusiasm
Choosing an informative agenda setter
The relation between the European Commission and the EU member states in the transatlantic Open Skies negotiations
Europeanization Beyond the Goodness of Fit
Procedural Change and the Sources of Ex Ante Constraints in EU Legislation
The role of oversight committees in closed rule legislation
The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations
Procedural models of European Union politics
Committee Decision-making in the Council of the European Union
Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union
The EU Annual Budgetary Procedure
Last Words on Delegation
Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay
Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy
Lost in Translation or Full Steam Ahead
Information and Legislative Organization
Deliberate Discretion?
Delegating Powers
Divided government and U.S. trade policy
The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union
The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union
The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union
Legislative Politics in the European Union
The national impact of European Union regulatory policy
From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision
Legislative Procedures in the European Community
Delegating Powers in the European Community
Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation
The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology
An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System
| Citations per year | 0.9 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |