The Formateur’s Bonus in European Constitutional Monarchies, 1901–99
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7910399 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Osnat Akirav (0000-0001-6270-6963, Western Galilee College), Gary W Cox (0000-0002-9256-5193, Stanford University) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 681-703 |
| Publication date | 2018-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12216 |
| OpenAlex | W2896184803 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 27 |
In this article, we examine bonuses garnered by government formateurs in all European democracies that began the 20th century as constitutional monarchies. Using a new data set on how portfolios were allocated in each democratic coalition cabinet formed 1901–99, we show that formateurs’ bonuses were positive and significant when the monarch still exercised discretion in choosing them but declined after the monarch’s role was constrained. Relatedly, Gamson’s Law was more strongly violated when monarchs played a larger role. After identifying the dates at which monarchs were constrained, we conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis, comparing formateurs’ bonuses in each reformed country with those in otherwise similar countries that did not reform at the same time. The results support the hypothesis that greater royal discretion engendered larger formateurs’ bonuses
Cabinet (room · Constitutional monarchy · Democracy · Discretion · Economics · Government (linguistics · Humanities · Monarchy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Verdict · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · History · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Systems and Governance
Democratic Delegation and Accountability
Mostly Harmless Econometrics
Negotiation in legislatures over government formation
Constitutions of Nations
Government Coalitions in Western Democracies
Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson’s Law
Measuring portfolio salience in Eastern European parliamentary democracies
Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies compared
Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation
Constitutional Power and Competing Risks
Constitutional Design and Government Formation
Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs
The portfolio allocation paradox
The Presidential Calculus
A Model of Farsighted Voting
The Logic of Gamson's Law
Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence
Bargaining in Legislatures
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |