Das Geistige Tier
Roger Scruton’s Recovery of Hegel
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7951408 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul T Wilford (0000-0001-8172-1325, Boston College) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Pages | 1-32 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Perspectives on Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1045-7097 • E-ISSN: 1930-5478 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10457097.2020.1854015 |
| OpenAlex | W3119277599 |
| Language | EN |
The doubleness of the human as both subject and object is the metaphysical mystery at the heart of Roger Scruton’s philosophy. In his exploration of this mystery, Scruton has recourse to the two towering figures of German Idealism, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel. This essay offers a reconstruction of Scruton’s appropriation of the legacy of German Idealism. It presents a synoptic analysis of the “metaphysics of the self” that undergirds Scruton’s political philosophy and his theology. The essay illuminates the systematic framework ordering Scruton’s many writings on politics, religion, esthetics, history, and culture. It demonstrates the coherence of his multifaceted body of work by showing how the various parts of his philosophy form an integrated whole grounded in a philosophical anthropology. This anthropology is justified by a cognitive dualist epistemology that draws on Kant’s critique of reason and Hegel’s account of mutual recognition. The essay follows Scruton's appropriation of the systematic distinctions that Hegel deploys in his inquiry into Geist, moving from subjective, to objective, to absolute spirit by considering how politics, culture, and religion emerge from the logic of the intersubjective encounter between individual agents
Appropriation · Epistemology · Geist · German idealism · Hegelianism · Idealism · Metaphysics · Political philosophy · Politics · Law · Philosophy · Reformation and Early Modern Christianity
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |