Logical Constants, or How to use Invariance in Order to Complete the Explication of Logical Consequence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7956939 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Denis Bonnay (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 54-65 |
| Publication date | 2014-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12095 |
| OpenAlex | W2149625253 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 14 |
The problem of logical constants consists in finding a principled way to draw the line between those expressions of a language that are logical and those that are not. The criterion of invariance under permutation, attributed to Tarski, is probably the most common answer to this problem, at least within the semantic tradition. However, as the received view on the matter, it has recently come under heavy attack. Does this mean that the criterion should be amended, or maybe even that it should be abandoned? I shall review the different types of objections that have been made against invariance as a logicality criterion and distinguish between three kinds of objections, skeptical worries against the very relevance of such a demarcation, intensional warnings against the level at which the criterion operates, and extensional quarrels against the results that are obtained. I shall argue that the first two kinds of objections are at least partly misguided and that the third kind of objection calls for amendment rather than abandonment
Epistemology · Explication · Extensional definition · Logical consequence · Political science · Reinterpretation · Skepticism · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2023 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |