Materialism and the Activity of Matter in Seventeenth‐Century European Philosophy

Bibliographic Data

ID7956958
AuthorsStewart Duncan (University of Florida, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume11
Issue11
Pages671-680
Publication date2016-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12358
OpenAlexW2555816299
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited18

Early modern debates about the nature of matter interacted with debates about whether matter could think. In particular, some philosophers (e.g. Cudworth and Leibniz) objected to materialism about the human mind on the grounds that matter is passive, thinking things are active, and one cannot make an active thing out of passive material. This paper begins by looking at two 17‐century materialist views (Hobbes's, and one suggested but not endorsed by Locke) before considering that objection (which I call here the Activity Argument). In discussion, I note that several philosophers of the time believed that matter was active. That view opens up a possible response to the Activity Argument. The paper concludes by looking at the views of two materialists of the time who also believed that matter was active, Toland and Cavendish

Eliminative materialism · Epistemology · Materialism · Chemistry · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

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