The Politics of Temporary Work Deregulation in Europe

Solving the French Puzzle

Bibliographic Data

ID7973569
AuthorsTim Vlandas (0000-0003-4245-3932, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume41
Issue3
Pages425-460
Publication date2013-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics & Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3292 • E-ISSN: 1552-7514
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0032329213493754
OpenAlexW1982585055
LanguageEN
Citations received20

Temporary work has expanded in the last three decades with adverse implications for inequalities. Because temporary workers are a constituency that is unlikely to impose political costs, governments often choose to reduce temporary work regulations. While most European countries have indeed implemented such reforms, France went in the opposite direction, despite having both rigid labor markets and high unemployment. My argument to solve this puzzle is that where replaceability is high, workers in permanent and temporary contracts have overlapping interests, and governments choose to regulate temporary work to protect permanent workers. In turn, replaceability is higher where permanent workers’ skills are general and wage coordination is low. Logistic regression analysis of the determinants of replaceability—and how this affects governments’ reforms of temporary work regulations—supports my argument. Process tracing of French reforms also confirm that the left has tightened temporary work regulations to compensate for the high replaceability

Argument (complex analysis · Deregulation · Economics · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Temporary work · Unemployment · Wage · Work (physics · Employment and Welfare Studies · Engineering · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions · Law

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