Concepts and measures of bureaucratic constraints in European Union laws from hand‐coding to machine‐learning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7997750 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fabio Franchino (0000-0001-8774-6494, corresponding author), Marta Migliorati (0000-0001-5091-8010), Giovanni Pagano (0000-0002-7825-3003), Valerio Vignoli (0000-0002-7893-1433) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 688-703 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-28 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Regulation & Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1748-5983 • E-ISSN: 1748-5991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rego.12543 |
| OpenAlex | W4382723313 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 32 |
Scholars employ two main measures of the executive constraints embedded in European Union laws: one is based on the variation in the use of different types of restrictions, and the second is based on the frequency of such use. They reflect two alternative conceptualizations of bureaucratic control. We label them, respectively, as the “toolbox perspective” and the “design perspective”. We illustrate that the constraint frequency measure poses fewer validity problems in estimating legislators' intent to constrain implementation and tends to produce less severe measurement errors. We then evaluate the performance in estimating constraint variation of a recent computational application and identify potential drawbacks of automated learning from hand‐coded provisions. We lastly introduce a skeletal framework for a machine‐learning approach based on the syntactic structures employed by legislators that could improve the performance of this innovative technique
Bureaucracy · Coding (social sciences · Constraint (computer-aided design · Economics · European union · International trade · Machine learning · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Programming language · Statistics · Toolbox · Variation (astronomy · Computer Science · European and International Law Studies · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Mathematics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Artificial Intelligence
Deliberate Discretion?
The Powers of the Union
Delegating Powers
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Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union
Policy complexity in the European Union, 1993-today
Policy complexity and legislative duration in the European Union
Measuring actual discretion of the European Commission
Joint bodies in the European Union's international agreements
Information, Commitment and Consensus
Delegating Powers in the European Community
Understanding Delegation Through Machine Learning
Time to Comply
The Constraining Power of the Purse
Power in Text
For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch
Agency Design and Postlegislative Influence over the Bureaucracy
Text as Data
Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative Texts
Comparing transposition in the 27 member states of the EU
Politicisation and economic governance design
Complying with EU directives' requirements
The Watchdog or the Mandarin? Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process
The Effects of Supranational Delegation on Policy Development
Of Principal(s') Interest? A Disaggregated, Multiple Principals' Approach to Commission Discretion
Lost in Translation or Full Steam Ahead
Differentiation through flexibility in implementation
Text as Data
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |