Agents of privatization? Business groups and the rise of pension funds in Continental Europe

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8019573
AutoresMarek Naczyk (0000-0002-8884-6996, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, autor de correspondencia)
Año2012
Volumen11
Número3
Páginas441-469
Fecha de publicación2012-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSocio-Economic Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1475-1461 • E-ISSN: 1475-147X
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/ser/mws012
OpenAlexW2100943349
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas30
Referencias citadas12

This paper analyses business preferences towards the development of private pension funds. Existing studies about business involvement in welfare state reform equate capital with employers and focus on the socio-economic determinants of their preferences. In contrast, this paper also analyses the role of financial firms. Moreover, it develops a set of hypotheses about how institutions contribute to shape capital's preferences towards pension privatization. In particular, I study the impact of institutional feedback from the public/statutory pay-as-you-go system, from existing private/supplementary occupational pensions and the influence of social partnership. Financial firms are hypothesized to be a key proponent of pension privatization, while employers may have a much more ambivalent attitude. The argument is tested using a comparative historical analysis of pension debates in Belgium and France from the end of the 1970s until the mid-2000s

Argument (complex analysis · Business · Economics · General partnership · Labour economics · Market economy · Pension · Political science · Politics · Private pension · Statutory law · Welfare · Welfare state · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Retirement, Disability, and Employment · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Finance