Executive-Legislative Relations in Southern Europe
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8020632 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas D Lancaster (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 186-205 |
| Publication date | 1996-06-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | South European Society & Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1360-8746 • E-ISSN: 1743-9612 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13608749608539471 |
| OpenAlex | W1968131571 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 20 |
Emphasizing formal institutional arrangements, this article compares executive-legislative relations in the four southern European countries of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. After describing these political systems' relevant institutional features, four areas of executive-legislative relations are analyzed: the power to dissolve parliament, to dismiss the government, to initiate legislation and to legislate through decree. Throughout the analysis, this study concentrates on patterns of similarities and differences that have emerged in institutional arrangements and formal processes of executive-legislative relations in these four countries
Decree · Executive power · Government (linguistics · Legislation · Legislature · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Representation (politics · Sociology · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Democracy, Italian style
The Politics of Democratic Consolidation
The Triumph of Democracy
Stabilising Fragile Democracies
Greece in the 1980s
Parliament and democratic consolidation in southern Europe
Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy
Spain
From Dictatorship to Democracy
In Search of Modern Portugal
Spain after Franco
Thirty Years of the Italian Republic
The New Parliament in Portugal
Portugal's Parliament
| Citations per year | 0.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 2021 (26) |
| Highly cited | No |