Does Cohabitation Matter? French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government

Bibliographic Data

ID8041906
AuthorsDirk Leuffen (0000-0002-0419-387X, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume32
Issue6
Pages1140-1160
Publication date2009-10-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueWest European Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01402380903230603
OpenAlexW2093889381
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited48

This article analyses French European policy-making in the context of divided government, arguing that in the area of European policy-making cohabitation increases the number of veto players, as compared with unified government. The increase of veto players, in turn, reduces France's acceptance-sets at the European table and thereby introduces a status quo bias. In order to test this theory, use is made of a comparative case study design. Process-tracing and counterfactual analyses reveal that veto player theory can, indeed, be applied to the interactions of a split-executive government

Cohabitation · Context (archaeology · Economics · European union · Geography · Government (linguistics · International economics · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Public economics · Status quo · Status quo bias · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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