Contractarianism and Animal Rights

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8066795
AutoresMark Rowland (0000-0002-5567-9562, autor de correspondencia), MARK ROWLANDS (0000-0001-9152-902X)
Año1997
Volumen14
Número3
Páginas235-247
Fecha de publicación1997-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-5930.00060
OpenAlexW2063795178
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas28
Referencias citadas1

It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non‐human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non‐human animals possess direct moral status, independently of their utility for rational agents, and independently of whatever interests rational agents may have in them. The version of contractarianism I shall focus upon is that defended by John Rawls

Animal rights · Economics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Focus (optics · Law and economics · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Politics · Rational agent · Simple (philosophy · Social contract · Sociology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophy