How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law
Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8068993 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kenneth R Westphal (0000-0001-6039-760X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Pages | 208 |
| Publication date | 2016-04-07 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747055.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W2498777953 |
| ISBN | 9780198747055 |
| Open Library | OL27724346M |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies. He argues that focusing on the differences between these two accounts occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a constructivist account of the basic principles of justice which does not depend on moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism
Appeal · Arbitrariness · Constructivism (international relations · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Natural law · Objectivity (philosophy · Political science · Politics · Possession (linguistics · Practical reason · Realism · Social constructivism · Transcendental number · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · david Hume (1711-1776) · immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |