Human Nature, Personhood, and Ethical Naturalism

Bibliographic Data

ID8069428
AuthorsJohn Hacker-Wright (0000-0002-2463-3369, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume84
Issue3
Pages413-427
Publication date2009-06-05
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8191 • E-ISSN: 1469-817X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0031819109000394
OpenAlexW2071692372
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited2

John McDowell has argued that for human needs to matter in practical deliberation, we must have already acquired the full range of character traits that are imparted by an ethical upbringing. Since our upbringings can diverge considerably, his argument makes trouble for any Aristotelian ethical naturalism that wants to support a single set of moral virtues. I argue here that there is a story to be told about the normal course of human life according to which it is no coincidence that there is agreement on the virtues. Because we are creatures who arrive at personhood only by learning from others in a relation of dependency, we cannot help but see ourselves as creatures for whom non-instrumental rationality is the norm. Those who train others in personhood must view the trainee's interests as having a value independent of their interests and must imbue the trainee with a sense of that value. Extending and preserving the sense of self-worth that we must acquire if we are to acquire personhood requires we see ourselves as creatures who need something like the virtues

Argument (complex analysis · Creatures · Deliberation · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Naturalism · Norm (philosophy · Personhood · Rationality · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophy

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