Kant on Cognition, Givenness, and Ignorance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8073718 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Chignell (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 131-142 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the history of philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-5053 • E-ISSN: 1538-4586 |
| Publisher | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1353/hph.2017.0005 |
| OpenAlex | W2581262851 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 2 |
My goal in this paper is to examine two central aspects of Kant's theory of cognition (Erkenntnis) in the context of the account offered by Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek. I first focus on what it is for an object to be "given" to the mind and how such "givenness" (allegedly) underwrites both mental representation and reference. I then consider Watkins and Willaschek's interpretation of Kant's claim that we cannot cognize things-in-themselves, and conclude by sketching an alternative (and less empiricistic) account of that claim
Cognition · Cognitive science · Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Focus (optics · Ignorance · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Mental representation · Object (grammar · Representation (politics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · History · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,78 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |