Nietzsche on Truth and the Value of Falsehood

Bibliographic Data

ID8074364
AuthorsAlexander Nehamas (0000-0001-6051-2903, Princeton University, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume48
Issue3
Pages319-346
Publication date2017-11-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Nietzsche Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0968-8005 • E-ISSN: 1538-4594
PublisherThe Pennsylvania State University Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0319
OpenAlexW2770954926
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited1

Nietzsche often gives the impression that all human beliefs are false. Some scholars, like Maudemarie Clark, believe that such a “falsification thesis” is unacceptable and try to limit Nietzsche's commitment to it, claiming that he abandons it in his very last works. Others, like Lanier Anderson and Nadeem Hussain, take it in ways that make it true and locate it in all. I argue that the view that is common to both approaches—that Nietzsche held that thesis in the first place—is unjustified. To that end, I interpret the texts where these scholars claim to find the thesis in a way that shows that they do not commit Nietzsche to it, and I offer some reasons for thinking that this is a more fruitful way of interpreting his views on the importance of truth—and falsehood—and their function in the economy of human life

Commit · Epistemology · Function (biology · Limit (mathematics · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Philosophy

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