Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8075029 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Samuel Scheffler (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 229-246 |
| Publication date | 1982-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00455091.1982.10715793 |
| OpenAlex | W2298404620 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
| References cited | 7 |
It is not uncommon for contemporary moral philosophers to appeal, in support or in criticism of one moral theory or another, to supposed features of or facts about persons. Rawls, for example, maintains that ‘utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons,’ and that since ‘the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing,’ we should not expect utilitarianism to be the correct regulative scheme for human beings. Nozick, in a similar spirit, suggests that the deontological restrictions he calls ‘side constraints’ are desirable components of a moral conception because, without them, a moral scheme is unable to ‘sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that ... [each individual] is a separate person,’ unable to take account of the fact that, with respect to each individual, ‘his is the only life he has.’ And Williams, to cite still another example, suggests that utilitarianism is a defective moral theory because ‘it cannot coherently describe the relations between a man's projects and his actions
Aesthetics · Appeal · Criticism · Epistemology · Identity (music · Moral disengagement · Morality · Normative ethics · Personal identity · Political science · Self · Sociology · Utilitarianism · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophy
The Absurd Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion
Why We Should Reject S
The Mere Addition Paradox
What We Believe Ourselves to Be
Personal Identity and Morality
The Non‐Identity Problem
Different Attitudes to Time
How We Are not What We Believe
The Best Objection to the Self‐Interest Theory
A World Without Deception
Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics
What Does Matter
Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Theories That Are Indirectly Self‐Defeating
Personal Identity and Rationality
Concluding Chapter
Practical Dilemmas
Conclusions
Why Our Identity Is not What Matters
The Appeal to Full Relativity
Persons, Interests, and Justice
Reasons and Persons
Parfit, l’égoïsme rationnel et la question de l’identité personnelle
Shame and Blame
Personal Identity and Practical Reason
| Citations per year | 0.65 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1986 - 2015 (30) |
| Highly cited | No |