Continuity in the History of Autonomy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8077323 |
|---|---|
| Authors | T H Irwin, Terence Irwin (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 442-459 |
| Publication date | 2011-09-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2011.608878 |
| OpenAlex | W2086188767 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 11 |
Six apparent features of Kant's conception of autonomy appear to differentiate it sharply from anything that we can find in an Aristotelian conception of will and practical reason. (1) Autonomy requires a role for practical reason independent of its instrumental role in relation to non-rational desires. (2) This role belongs to the rational will. (3) This role consists in the rational will's being guided by its own law. (4) This guidance by the law of the will itself requires acts of legislation—the making of laws—for oneself. (5) These acts of legislation constitute the law as one's own law, as moral constructivists hold. (6) Kant marks this character of the rational will by using “autonomy” and cognates. These six apparent features, however, do not mark any discontinuity between Kant and an Aristotelian conception. The first three apparent features are genuinely Kantian, but are not aspects of discontinuity, whereas the last three mark aspects of discontinuity, but are not genuinely Kantian
Autonomy · Character (mathematics · Discontinuity (linguistics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Legislation · Political science · Relation (database · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Law · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,08 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2013 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |