How Kant Justifies Freedom of Agency ( without Transcendental Idealism)

Bibliographic Data

ID8080348
AuthorsKenneth R Westphal (0000-0001-6039-760X, Department of Philosophy Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Turkey, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume25
Issue4
Pages1695-1717
Publication date2017-04-25
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12264
OpenAlexW2608289635
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited39

This paper argues that the problem of the apparent conflict between freedom of action and natural causal determinism has not been properly framed, because the key premiss—the thesis of universal causal determinism—is, in the domain of human behaviour, an unjustified conjecture based on over‐simplified, under‐informed explanatory models. Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference (explained herein), which stands independently of his Transcendental Idealism, justifies and emphasises a quadruple distinction between causal description, causal ascription (predication), (approximately) true causal ascription (accurate predication) and cognitively justified causal ascription. Contemporary causal theories of mind, of action or of meaning do not suffice for causal a scription, and so cannot suffice for causal predication, and hence cannot justify causal determinism about human behaviour. More generally, the principle of universal causal determinism is a regulative principle governing causal inquiry and was so formulated by LaPlace. Only successful, sufficient causal explanation of particular events provides for causal knowledge of those events. Such knowledge we lack in the domain of human behaviour. Rational belief, including scientific belief, requires apportioning belief to justifying evidence; all else is conjecture or speculation, which do not justify premises of sound proofs. Causal determinism about human behaviour remains unjustified speculation, for sound Critical reasons Kant provided us in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft . In these regards, contemporary debates about these issues remain decidedly pre‐Critical

Ascription · Causal theory of reference · Causality (physics · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Transcendental number · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy

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