Reasons or Fittingness First
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8081789 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Rowland (0000-0002-0471-1948, corresponding author), Rach Cosker-Rowland |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 212-229 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-22 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/692949 |
| OpenAlex | W2759830869 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 4 |
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first
Epistemology · Normative · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |