On ‘Modal Personism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8082304 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeff Mcmahan (0000-0003-3720-4165, Corpus Christi College University of Oxford Merton Street Oxford OX1 4JF UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 26-30 |
| Publication date | 2015-12-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/japp.12167 |
| OpenAlex | W2195821729 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
In this article I present several challenges to the view that S helly K agan calls ‘modal personism’. First, there is a plausible account of our identity that, if true, greatly diminishes the scope of K agan's view. But the scope of the view is already quite limited because the category of modal persons is restricted to those non‐persons that had but have lost the potential to become persons. If the category were to include non‐persons that retain the potential to become persons, K agan's view would have implausible implications about abortion and about the moral status of certain animals
Abortion · Aesthetics · Epistemology · Identity (music · Modal · Scope (computer science · Sociology · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1.33 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |