Kant, The Actualist Principle, and The Fate of the Only Possible Proof
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8082633 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Uygar Abaci, Uygar Abacı (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 261-291 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the history of philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-5053 • E-ISSN: 1538-4586 |
| Publisher | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1353/hph.2017.0029 |
| OpenAlex | W2606455989 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 9 |
Commentators have repeatedly claimed that Kant offers a tacit restatement of his pre-critical "only possible proof" in the Critique of Pure Reason, downgrading its conclusion from the (objectively) necessary existence of God to the (subjectively) necessary presupposition of the idea of God, but none has successfully accounted for where and why exactly Kant thinks the proof fails as an objective demonstration. I suggest that (a) the proof fails because it mistreats the actualist principle, "every possibility must be grounded in actuality," as an ontological principle applying to the real possibilities of things in general, whereas in its critically legitimate version this principle expresses an epistemological condition of our cognition of the real possibility of empirical objects; (b) this metaphysical error in the proof occurs due to a transcendental illusion
Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Illusion · Metaphysics · Presupposition · Transcendental number · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,63 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |