Kant on materialism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8085236
AutoresEmma Watkins (0000-0001-6488-7235, autor de correspondencia), Eric Watkins
Año2016
Volumen24
Número5
Páginas1035-1052
Fecha de publicación2016-09-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2016.1230091
OpenAlexW2523948751
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas3

In this paper I argue that Kant’s complex argument against materialism involves not only his generic commitment to the existence of non-spatio-temporal and thus non-material things in themselves (which follows directly from Transcendental Idealism), but also considerations pertaining to reason and the subject of our thoughts. Specifically, I argue that because Kant conceives of reason in such a way that it demands a commitment to the existence of the unconditioned so that we can account for whatever conditioned objects we encounter in experience, our thoughts, which are also conditioned, require something unconditioned that, because it is unconditioned, cannot be material. In this way, Kant’s attitude towards materialism is based not only on abstract features of his metaphysics and epistemology, but also on specific features that were under serious discussion in the early modern period

Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Idealism · Materialism · Metaphysics · Subject (documents · Transcendental idealism · Transcendental number · Chemistry · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy