Kant on the Number of Worlds
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8088005 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ralph C S Walker (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 821-843 |
| Publication date | 2010-11-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2010.524759 |
| OpenAlex | W2088283310 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 26 |
It has long been disputed whether Kant's transcendental idealism requires two worlds – one of appearances and one of things in themselves – or only one. The one-world view must be wrong if it claims that individual spatio-temporal things can be identified with particular things in themselves, and if it fails to take seriously the doctrine of double affection; versions that insist on one world, without making claims about the identity of individual things, cannot say in what way the world as we know it and the world of things in themselves can be ‘the same’. The two-world view must be wrong if it denies Kant's empirical realism, or offers a phenomenalist interpretation of it. On moral grounds Kant ‘identifies’ each human person with a particular thing in itself, but the relationship here cannot be strict identity; instead its closeness may warrant regarding the two distinct entities as part of a composite whole. Perhaps up to the first edition of the Critique, Kant thought that empirical knowledge required a particular kind of close correspondence between appearances and things in themselves, one that would make it appropriate to speak of composite wholes here also. By the time of the second edition, he saw that there could be no good grounds for thinking that. In this respect something a bit like the one-world theory might make more sense for the first edition than for the second; but in both cases there is room to speak of two worlds as well. Talk of the number of worlds is metaphorical, and both metaphors have their dangers
Aesthetics · Affection · Doctrine · Epistemology · Idealism · Identity (music · Interpretation (philosophy · Possible world · Realism · Theology · Transcendental idealism · Transcendental number · Warrant · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy
Empirical Realism
Die Raum- und Zeitlehre Alois Riehls im Kontext realistischer Interpretationen von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus
‘In Itself’
Two Worlds and Two Aspects
Things in themselves and naturalism
Grothendieck’s theory of schemes and the algebra–geometry duality
Sameness beyond numerical identity. A defence of the One Object View of Kant ́s transcendental idealism
Transcendental idealism and Kant's reconciliation of determinism and libertarianism
Establishing the Existence of Things in Themselves
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency
Kant on intuitive understanding and things in themselves
Idealism and Freedom
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
Kant's Analytic
Kant and the Claims of Knowledge
Reason, Truth and History
Recent Work On Kant's Theoretical Philosophy
Kantian Idealism Today
Problems from Kant
Erscheinung bei Kant
Kant's One World
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
Kant, Science, and Human Nature
Interpreting Kant's Critiques
Accessing Kant
Strawson on Transcendental Idealism
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |