What's Really Wrong with the Limited Quantity View
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8089405 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tim Mulgan (0000-0002-9368-1524, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 153-164 |
| Publication date | 2001-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9329.00152 |
| OpenAlex | W1980118038 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
In Part Four of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit seeks Theory X – the Utilitarian account of the morality of choices where the number of people who will ever exist depends upon our actions. Parfit argues that X has yet to be found. The two simplest versions of Theory X are Total Utilitarianism and Average Utilitarianism. Unfortunately, Parfit argues, each of these leads to unacceptable results. Parfit explores various alternatives and finds them all unsatisfactory. This paper deals with one of those alternatives: the Limited Quantity View. I argue that Parfità s argument against this view fails. However, I then present a new and more general objection which defeats a broad range of utilitarian views, including the Limited Quantity View
Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Epistemology · Morality · Positive economics · Utilitarianism · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |