Naturalism Without Tears
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8091050 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Lenman (0000-0003-3823-6089, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-18 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-21 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00415.x |
| OpenAlex | W2166067580 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Parfit argues that naturalistic theories that seek to understand normative concepts either as simply descriptive of certain natural facts about our desires or as expressive of our desires commit us to a bleak normative nihilism whereby nothing matters. I here defend such naturalism, in particular its expressivist variety, against this charge. It is true that such views commit us to there being no reasons as Parfit understands them. But for Parfit to suppose that equivalent to there being no reasons leaves him begging the question where the relative credibility of these rival understandings is just what is at issue. 1
Commit · Credibility · Epistemology · Expressivism · Naturalism · Normative · Nothing · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.08 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2013 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |