Evolution and Impartiality

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8092183
AutoresGuy Kahane (0000-0002-6490-3247, autor correspondente)
Ano2013
Volume124
Fascículo2
Páginas327-341
Data de publicação2013-12-12
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEthics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/673433
PMID24711673
OpenAlexW2093942758
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas13
Referências citadas11

Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that evolutionary considerations can resolve Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, because such considerations debunk moral views that give weight to self-interested or partial considerations, but cannot threaten the principle Universal Benevolence. I argue that even if we grant these claims, this appeal to evolution is ultimately self-defeating. Lazari-Radek and Singer face a dilemma. Either their evolutionary argument against partial morality succeeds, but then we need to also give up our conviction that suffering is bad; or there is a way to defend this conviction, but then their argument against partiality fails. Utilitarians, I suggest, should resist the temptation to appeal to evolutionary debunking arguments

Appeal · Argument (complex analysis · Conviction · Dilemma · Dualism · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept · Impartiality · Law and economics · Morality · Political science · Sociology · Temptation · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Law · Philosophy