A Metaphysics for Freedom
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 8093722 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Helen Steward (0000-0003-1654-577X, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2012 |
| Páginas | 267 |
| Data de publicação | 2012-03-08 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Periódico | A metaphysics for freedom (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552054.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W1566893064 |
| Open Library | OL25369889M |
| ISBN | 9780199552054 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 105 |
Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself - not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom
Action (physics · Agency (philosophy · Argument (complex analysis · Causation · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Indeterminism · Intelligibility (philosophy · Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Agent (philosophy) · Free will and determinism · Philosophy
Aristotle's Four Causes of Action
Responses
Time, realism, news
The Virtue of Aggression in Sport
Extended Dispositionalism and Determinism
Direct Manipulation Undermines Intentional Agency (Not Just Free Agency)
Probabilism
Joint Guidance
The relationship between free will and consciousness
Unavoidable actions
From causation to conscious control
Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to ( β )
See what I didn’t do there
A new puppet puzzle
Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities
Two Kinds of Self-Expression
Forming and exercising professional judgement
Varieties of Power
Bradley's Regress and a Problem in Action Theory
Acting as causing change
I, myself, move
Representation in action
Habitual virtuous action and acting for reasons
The Disappearing Agent and the Phenomenology of Agency
A Dilemma for Reductive Compatibilism
Excuses and Alternatives
What Kind of ‘God’ do Hindu Arguments for the Divine Show? Five Novel Divine Attributes of Brahman
Accommodating the Whims of the Will
Are Two-Way Powers Causal Powers
Aristotle On Two-Way Powers
On Action and Integration
Introduction
Rational Powers and Knowledge of Counterparts in Aristotle
Power collapse
Mereological emergentism and agent-causal libertarianism
Agentially controlled action
Agential capacities
Action, self, and virtual reality
Agentive Duality reconsidered
What can we do? Collective ability, and co-agential capacity
The Form of Agency
Thing causation
Agency incompatibilism, luck, and intelligibility
How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will
Agent-causal, event-causal, libertarian free will
Do group agents have free will
A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will
Frankfurt cases, alternative possibilities and agency as a two-way power
The disappearing agent as an exclusion problem
Idealization, animals, and democracy
Some hope for Kant’s Groundwork III
A Control Theory of Action
Beyond the Postmetaphysical Turn
The Power of Absence
Productive freedom
Agential possibilities
Why psychological scientists should disdain determinism
Ability to do otherwise, reasons, and causes
When Minds Converse
Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy
The Union of the Soul and the Body
Mindfulness and Agential Control
Schelling's Liberation of Reason from Itself
The Case for Consent Pluralism
Creativity as a higher agency
Are there subintentional actions
Acting on reasons
Metaphysics for Responsibility to Nature
Adorno, Freedom and Criminal Law
Emergent agent causation
Causality and determination, powers and agency
I’m just sitting around doing nothing
Causality, determination and necessitation in free human action
Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given
Alternative possibilities and asymmetry
The practical standpoint
Knowledge and agential control
An introduction to real possibilities, indeterminism, and free will
Exercising abilities
On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism
Supporting an agent-causal libertarian account of free will with a variant of Franklin’s ‘It Ain’t Me’ argument
Anscombe and Intentional Agency Incompatibilism (for human and animal agents)
Are abilities dispositions
Attitudinal control
Reasoning and its limits
Implicit bias as unintentional discrimination
Causality, determination and free will
Causal pluralism
Introducing a four-fold way to conceptualize artificial agency
The libertarian predicament
In defense of flip-flopping
Animals run about the world in all sorts of paths’
Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences
Urges
Powers, Non‐Consent and Freedom
Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise
A Dispositional Theory of Health
Agency, Intelligence and Reasons in Animals
Freedom. An impossible reality
Explicating Agency
| Obras citantes distintas | 105 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 8,08 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Sim |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 105 |