Demoralization and Hope

A Psychological Reading of Kant’s Moral Argument

Bibliographic Data

ID8095893
AuthorsAndrew Chignell (Princeton University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume106
Issue1
Pages46-60
Publication date2023-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Monist (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0026-9662 • E-ISSN: 2153-3601
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/monist/onac022
OpenAlexW4381295767
LanguageEN
Citations received8

Kant’s “primacy of the practical” doctrine says that we can form morally justified commitments regarding what exists, even in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds. In this paper I critically examine three different varieties of Kant’s “moral proof” that can be found in the critical works. My claim is that the third variety—the “moral-psychological argument” based in the need to sustain moral hope and avoid demoralization—has some intriguing advantages over the other two. It starts with a premise that more clearly coheres with Kant’s mature account of moral motivation, and it invokes plausible empirical-psychological theses to motivate a commitment to the full-blown classical deity—the result Kant clearly wanted. From the point of view of its structure, I think this third variety of moral argument also has the most by way of contemporary interest

Argument (complex analysis · Disposition · Doctrine · Epistemology · Moral psychology · Premise · Reading (process · Theology · Variety (cybernetics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Philosophy

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