Neutrality in the Social Sciences

On Bhaskar's argument for an essential emancipatory impulse in social science

Bibliographic Data

ID8098838
AuthorsHugh Lacey (0000-0002-7037-0088, Swarthmore College, corresponding author)
Year1997
Volume27
Issue2-3
Pages213-241
Publication date1997-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-5914.00035
OpenAlexW2169487532
LanguageEN
Citations received6

Suppose that one accepts a theory that proposes that a certain group’s holding of a false belief is co‐caused by (e.g.) a specified social structure. Then, Bhaskar has argued, one is rationally committed, ceteris paribus , to adopting a negative value judgment of that structure (the theory is not value neutral) and a positive value judgment of activity directed towards removing it (the theory is partial towards emancipation). Contrary to Bhaskar, I argue that any rational move from accepting a theory to value judgments is mediated either by further value judgments, or by the role played by value‐impregnated theoretical terms. Furthermore, I argue (drawing upon a well known argument of Rudner), Bhaskar’s argument tends not to be applicable in the case of theories that assign certain kinds of causal roles to social structures. Reflection on Bhaskar’s argument, however, leads to a deeper grasp of the relations between accepting theories in the social sciences and adopting value judgments

Argument (complex analysis · Ceteris paribus · Economics · Epistemology · Neutrality · Positive economics · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Critical Realism in Sociology · Mathematics · Philosophy · Weber, Simmel, Sociological Theory

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