The "Possibility" of a Categorical Imperative

Kant's Groundwork, Part III

Bibliographic Data

ID8100729
AuthorsDavid Copp (0000-0002-5206-5223, corresponding author)
Year1992
Volume6
Pages261-261
Publication date1992-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1520-8583 • E-ISSN: 1758-2245
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2214248
OpenAlexW2318041145
LanguageEN
Citations received14

In part III of Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals, Kant attempted to solve a that he took to be an especially serious one for his moral philosophy. He described it as of showing the of a categorical imperative.1 At end of part II of Groundwork, he said that he needed to show this in order to show that morality is something real, and not a chimerical idea without any truth-that morality is not a mere phantom of brain (Ak 445).2 The importance of this to Kant's argument in Groundwork can scarcely be denied.3 The possibility problem must be faced by any non-skeptical moral philosophy, as I will explain. My goal in this paper is to show how Kant saw problem, to show how it arose in context of his moral philosophy, and to explain his attempt to solve it. I shall explore Kant's argument in Groundwork III, and intuitions that underlie it. I shall also examine two recent reconstructions of argument, by Henry Allison and Thomas Hill, Jr. My overall goal is to locate a for moral theory in work of Kant, but to discourage idea that it can be solved by means of a Kantian strategy. I will argue that there are major hurdles in way of a Kantian solution

Categorical imperative · Categorical variable · Epistemology · Morality · Statistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification · Philosophy