Critical Realism and the Process Account of Emergence

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8101136
AutoresStephen Pratten (0000-0001-6027-7528, Department of Management King's College London Franklin Wilkins Building 150 Stamford Street London SE1 9NH, autor de correspondencia)
Año2013
Volumen43
Número3
Páginas251-279
Fecha de publicación2013-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/jtsb.12017
OpenAlexW1548826881
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas16
Referencias citadas37

For advocates of critical realism emergence is a central theme. Critical realists typically ground their defence of the relative disciplinary autonomy of various sciences by arguing that emergent phenomena exist in a robust non‐ontologically, non‐causally reductionist sense. Despite the importance they attach to it critical realists have only recently begun to elaborate on emergence at length and systematically compare their own account with those developed by others. This paper clarifies what is distinctive about the critical realist account of emergence by comparing it with an alternative. Critical realism and interactivism are shown to independently converge on the same general process (or constraint) view of emergence and develop complementary accounts of particular emergents

Autonomy · Constraint (computer-aided design · Critical realism (philosophy of perception · Discipline · Epistemology · Political science · Process (computing · Realism · Reductionism · Social science · Sociology · Theme (computing · Computer Science · Critical Realism in Sociology · Emile Durkheim and Sociology · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science