Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8106568
AutoresDominika Dzwonkowska (0000-0002-2060-2901, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, autor de correspondencia)
Año2018
Volumen31
Número6
Páginas723-738
Fecha de publicación2018-11-19
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1187-7863 • E-ISSN: 1573-322X
EditorialSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s10806-018-9751-6
OpenAlexW2901421597
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas35

Virtue ethics (VE), due to its eudaimonistic character, is very anthropocentric; thus the application of VE to environmental ethics (EE) seems to be in contradiction with EE’s critical opinion of human centeredness. In the paper, I prove the claim that there is a possibility of elaborating an environmental virtue ethics (EVE) that involves others (including nonhuman beings). I prove that claim through analyzing Ronald Sandler’s EVE, especially his concept of pluralistic virtue and a pluralistic approach to the aim of ethical endeavor which is not only focused on personal flourishing but also helps others (including nonhumans) to flourish. I start my analysis with a close look at the application of anthropocentrism in VE, beginning by discerning the three types of anthropocentrism that are most often used in discussion on EE and EVE, namely ontological, epistemological, and ethical. Subsequently, I analyze the concept of personal flourishing, which is responsible for the anthropocentric/egoistic nature of VE, proving that VE is anthropocentric/egoistic only formally, not in its content, and as such is only a rational theory, not a moral one

Anthropocentrism · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Sociology · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil