Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against Pseudo‐Arguments in Practical Philosophy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8106894 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ota Weinberger (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 252-268 |
| Publication date | 1992-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio Juris (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1794-6638 • E-ISSN: 2619-4066 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00128.x |
| OpenAlex | W2048706459 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 3 |
The author distinguishes two concepts of practical reason: (a) practical reason as a source of practical principles, and (b) practical reason as the theory of thought operations connected with action. He proves that there is no practical recognition in the sense (a). We can deal with actions only on the basis of dichotomic semantics. Critical analyses of some theories of practical reason are presented (Kant, Lorenzen, Apel, Alexy). The critical part of the paper mainly concerns the discourse theory and its implications for practical philosophy and jurisprudence
Action (physics · Epistemology · Jurisprudence · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Semantics (computer science · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Law and Political Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |