Substance and procedure in theories of prudential value
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8115653 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Valerie Tiberius (0000-0002-3048-1998, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 373-391 |
| Publication date | 2007-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048400701571628 |
| OpenAlex | W2036350639 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 20 |
In this paper I argue that the debate between subjective and objective theories of prudential value obscures the way in which elements of both are needed for a comprehensive theory of prudential value. I suggest that we characterize these two types of theory in terms of their different aims: procedural (or subjective) theories give an account of the necessary conditions for something to count as good for a person, while substantive (or objective) theories give an account of what is good for a person, given some set of necessary conditions. Characterizing the theories in this way allows us to see their mutual compatibility. To make this case, I assume that a theory of prudential value ought to be descriptively and normatively adequate. The criterion of descriptive adequacy requires that our theory explain the subject relativity of prudential value. I characterize subject relativity in terms of justifiability to subjects and I argue that certain procedural theories are well suited to meet this criterion. The criterion of normative adequacy requires that our theory be capable of guiding action and I argue that a certain kind of substantive theory is needed to meet this requirement
Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Normative · Set (abstract data type · Subject (documents · Value (mathematics · Value theory · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy
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| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2023 (10) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |