Possible Persons and the Problems of Posterity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8123721 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Grey (0000-0001-8209-5645, Department of Philosophy University of Queensland Brisbane 4072, Australia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 161-179 |
| Publication date | 1996-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Environmental Values (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0963-2719 • E-ISSN: 1752-7015 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.3197/096327196776679366 |
| OpenAlex | W2021174834 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 10 |
The moral status of future persons is problematic. It is often claimed that we should take the interests of the indefinite unborn very seriously, because they have a right to a decent life. It is also claimed (often by the same people) that we should allow unrestricted access to abortion, because the indefinite unborn have no rights. In this paper I argue that these intuitions are not in fact inconsistent. The aim is to provide an account of trans-temporal concern which resolves the prima facie inconsistency between commonly held intuitions about our obligations to future persons. I argue that our intuitions can be reconciled provided that we explicate obligations to the future in terms of impersonal principles subject to retroactive person-affecting constraints
Abortion · Epistemology · Law and economics · Prima facie · Sociology · Subject (documents · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 1998 - 2005 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |