Principle Ethics, Particularism and Another Possibility

Bibliographic Data

ID8123796
AuthorsSoran Reader (corresponding author)
Year1997
Volume72
Issue280
Pages269-292
Publication date1997-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8191 • E-ISSN: 1469-817X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0031819100056886
OpenAlexW2107934530
LanguageEN
Citations received16
References cited1

One of the most striking contributions of particularism to moral philosophy has been its emphasis on the relative opacity of the moral scene to the tools of rational analysis traditionally used by philosophers. Particularism changes the place of the philosopher in relation to the moral life, pointing up the limits to what philosophy can do here. The modern moral philosopher who takes particularism seriously no longer has the luxury, endemic in our tradition, of imagining that moral philosophy can be done with only passing illustrative reference to experience, or that the truth about the whole of our moral life may be read of a list of a priori moral principles, whose rationality is underwritten by the mechanistic account of what it is to follow a rule that pre-Wittgensteinian philosophers took for granted

Epistemology · Moral philosophy · Moral psychology · Rationality · Relation (database · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophy

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